Abstract. An error-recovery method for embedded multi-processor systems on SRAM-based FPGAs is proposed. This method is effective against soft-errors in the configuration memory, such as the errors caused by hIgh energy radiation also known as Single Event Upsets. The error-recovery algorithm performs on-line test of the ~PGA configuration memory and recovers errors using dynamic partial reconfiguration. Processor cores perform a dIstributed recovery procedure. If a failure occurs in the processor currently runOing the recovery algOrithm, another processor core takes the role and performs reconfiguration. Presented case study demonstrates the advantage of the proposed approach.
Introduction
Some SEU mitigation techniques use time redundancy but they are effective only against SRAM-based FPGA devices are steadily becoming transient faults. The most common SEU mitigation the most suitable platfonn for implementing modem techniques employ hardware redundancy like Triple embedded applications due to their high Modular Redundancy (TMR) and Error Correcting reconfigurability, low cost and availability. The Codes (ECC). In the case of TMR, design logic is modern high perfonnance Systems On Programmable triplicated and a voter is used to identify the correct Chip (SOPC) are often powered by multiple value [5, 16, 21, 25] . Since the voter is also vulnerable microprocessors.
to upsets an improved TMR strategy for FPGA was Due to the increasing integration density FPGA developed [5] . The voters are triplicated and chips are getting more and more prone to faulty implemented using dedicated FPGA logic resources. behavior caused by cosmic or artificial radiation TMR can be distributed over reconfigurable modules [13] , [14] . Such faults are modeled as Single Event and when the voter detects a fault the faulty module Upsets (SEUs). While radiation is a major concern in can be recovered by partial reconfiguration. A space [11] , systems in avionics and on ground level controller for managing the reconfiguration was are less exposed to it because of the planetary proposed by [3] . atmospheric and magnetic radiation shield. However, Error Correction Codes (ECC) [18] are also used experiments [13, 14, 17] showed that with increased to mitigate the SEU in integrated circuits. Different density of integrated circuits the neutron particles ECCs are used to protect systems against single and present in the atmosphere are also capable of multiple SEUs. The most common ECCs are producing SEU. It is imperative that FPGA based
Hamming codes and Reed-Solomon codes. ECCs are applications, where high reliability is required, include mostly used to protect memories of the systems. mechanisms that can easily and quickly detect and
The SEU recovery techniques in SRAM FPGAs COITect SEUs.
are also known as configuration scrubbing. In this work, the internal scrubbing technique from [7,9,12] is extended from single to multi core systems on chip. The scrubbing process is controlled by one of the processor cores, while others perform their normal operation. The advantage of our technique is that the error recovery algorithm is able to adopt itself: when a faul t causes erroneous behaviour on the scrubbing processor it can be recovered by another working processor. Our error recovery algorithm has been implemented in a case study and evaluated by a fault injection experiment.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the basis of FPGA configuration, determines the FPGA fault model, and evaluates the SEU risk in the atmosphere. In section 3 our technique is presented. Section 4 presents a dual processor system which serves as a case study of our method. A fault injection experiment is described and the reliability of the system is evaluated. In section 5 concluding remarks are drawn.
Preliminaries
In this section we briefly summarize the basic FPGA configuration, define the fault model considered in this paper, and assess the risk of SEU induced faults. Notice that while in the area of electronic testing faults are regarded as deterministic, discrete change in circuit behavior caused by different kinds of defects, in this paper we stick to the convention commonly adopted in reliability issues [19] that a fault is a mechanical or algorithmic cause of an error. The external routing consists of switch boxes and wiring segments shown in Fig. 1a . The connections of the switch box and the wiring segments are determined by the logic state of their configuration bits. A SEU affecting these configuration bits could disconnect the original CLB connection, or in another case, connect wrong CLBs. For illustration, some typical faults are shown in Fig. Ib (marked by cycle) .
The simplified structure of a CLB is shown in Fig. 2 ) CLB The FPGA configuration memory detennines the functionality of the FPGA organized in a network of configuration frames that are laid out on a device according to their frame address [23], [24] . A frame is the smallest reconfigurable part of FPGA. The size of a frame in Virtex 4 and Virtex 5 FPGA is 41 words of 32-bits. The frame address is comprised of block type (CLBs, BRAM contents, BRAM interconnect), top/bottom bit, row, major address, and minor address. The structUre of the FPGA configuration is depictured in Fig. 3. 
SEU risk assessment
It is known that SEUs are a major factor in the space applications, but there is also a considerable risk of SEU in the atmosphere. The atmospheric SEU risk assessment was made by Xilinx in the Rosetta experiment [13, 14] . In the experiment the effect of SEUs on different FPGAs at different altitudes was measured. The SEU error rate is stated in failures in time (FIT) or mean time between failures (MTBF). FIT is the number of failures that can be expected in 10 9 hours. 
Error-recovery technique for multiprocessor system
Our technique is designed for an embedded multiprocessor SOC on FPGAs. In this arrangement, one of the processor cores scans the configuration frames and perfom1s reconfiguration in the case of detected faults (first pass recovery). If the processor core itself is affected by SEU, another processor core takes the role and perfonns reconfiguration (extended recovery).
During system nonnal operation the selected processor core performs a configuration check in parallel with target system application. As stated in the introduction, FPGA circuits are vulnerable to SEU. A fault may occur in any configuration memory cell at any time. Consequently, a processor core which checks the configuration memory is also subject to SEU induced faults. In order to solve the problem, the processor core always performs a self-test after configuration check. We assume that if the processor core that checks the configuration core is corrupted, it will never report the result of the self-test as fault-free. This is analogous to the asymmetric test invalidation used in the BGM model [2] . Processor self-test can be accomplished in a number of ways, in our implementation we followed the approach proposed in [22].
Required hardware platform
The required hardware infrastructure is depictured in Fig. 4 • an internal partial reconfiguration interface that the processor cores have a common access to, • a mechanism for mutual exclusion to enable one process to gain exclusive access to a particular shared peripheral,
• an interrupt controller, • an external watchdog timer.
Error detection and recovery procedure
Error detection and correction is performed through the peripheral core with internal access to the FPGA configuration memory. In Xilinx FPGAs the Internal Configuration Access Port (lCAP) core is provided. The ICAP core enables an embedded microprocessor to read and write the FPGA configuration memory through the ICAP device at run time, which enables the user to write software programs for an embedded processor that modify the circuit structure and functionality during the circuit operation. Virtex 4 and Virtex 5 FPGA devices include a configuration Error Correcting Code (ECC) facility, U. Legat, A. Biasizzo, F. Novak which can be used to detect errors in the configuration frames. The ECC utilizes a Hamming code algorithm that locates single errors and detects double errors. After reading a configuration frame, the output of the ECC produces a syndrome value. For any single error in the frame, the II-bit syndrome value identifies an erroneous bit within the frame. Table 2 provides a decomposition of the syndrome value and its corresponding error status. 
Error recovery algorithm
A processor on which the configuration read back and error correcting will run is selected. The test algorithm scans through all the configuration frames. It reads and examines the ECC syndrome value of a particular frame and in the case of a fault takes appropriate actions. A fault can manifest in different ways. • A double error occurs on non-selected processors or other peripherals. The fault can be detected but cannot be corrected. The entire system is reconfigured.
• An error stops the selected processor. After time out, the watchdog timer triggers the next processor which tries to correct the fault.
• The selected processor reports faulty self-test result. The processor stops. After time-out, the watchdog timer triggers the next processor which tries to correct the fault.
• An error affects the clock routing. The watchdog timer detects the fault. The fault is uncorrectable. The entire system is reconfigured. Configuration memory check and recovery runs on one processor while other processors perform user operations. In our implementation, the processor that currently performs the algorithm is selected in a round robin fashion. Other test scheduling strategies are possible at the operation system level.
Practical application of error recovery method
The recovery algorithm was studied on a dual MicroBlaze processor design. Both processors have access to external memory. Apart from sharing the external memory, the two processors have their own local memory. Each processor has an interrupt controller assigned to it to handle interrupts. The processors have a common access to the XPS_hwicap core. This Xilinx core is used for internal access to the configuration. It enables readback of the configuration memory and the partial reconfiguration. The processors use the Xilinx XPS_Mutex core to synchronize the access to the shared peripherals. The design also has an external hardware watchdog timer connected to the processors through the Fast Symplex Link (FSL). Fig. 5 shows a block diagram of the dual processor system.
We implemented the soft-core multiprocessor design on Virtex 5 FPGA device. The hardware components were assembled, compiled, and downloaded to the board using Xilinx EDK tool. software was developed in Xilinx SDK tool and debugged using hardware debugger interface via MDM core. The test algorithm runs on one processor at a time and is triggered by interrupts. When a processor finishes the check and self-test correctly it triggers the interrupt on the next processor. If a fault causes the error on the processor and it fails the self-check or stalls during the check, the watchdog timer is not reset in time. It counts down and it triggers an interrupt on the next working processor to correct the fault.
SEU fault emulation experiment
Fault emulation experiment was perfonned to assess the performance of the error recovery algorithm. Fault emulation was assisted by an external computer. The program on the computer randomly selected the location of the fault and crated "faulty" partial bitstream. Then the altered partial bitstream was sent to the device through the JTAG configuration interface. The system on the FPGA was monitored using the RS-232 serial communication.
For each injected fault, system self-test was perfonned in order to detennine if the injected fault was located in the FPGA configuration memory used for the target application or not. In this particular case, y t ill self-test can be regarded as the actual target application. Next. for the same injected fault the proposed error detection and recovery algorithm was performed in a round robin fashion. If the system on the FPGA had not recovered from the fault, the whole configuration was reconfigured before the next injected fault. The structure of the fault emulation system is shown in Fig. 6 . The time period between two injected faults was large enough for the system to finish error recovery and test program on both processors. Table 3 presents the results of the fault emulation experiment. 5000 random single bit flip faults were injected into the system. 247 of them (i.e" 4.9 %) U. Legat, A. Biasizzo, F. Novak affected some critical location and caused a fault in the tested system. 188 out of 247 (i.e., 76 %) were detected and recovered by the error recovery algorithm, while the remaining 59 caused the system to faiL From the 188 recovered faults, 61 faults caused the processor failure on the scrubbing processor and the system was recovered by the other working processor. Obtained fault emulation results were compared to other reported solutions. The techniques described in [9] and [12J use the same principle of error detection and correction. The recovery controller is a single embedded microprocessor (PicoBlaze). The recovery method depends on the correct operation of the processor controller: if a fault causes the processor to fail the system cannot be recovered. Our technique has the advantage that it can adopt itself to another working processor and recover the system. As shown in Table 3 , 247 faults affected the system under test. The system has recovered from 127 by the first processor unit (the same techniques as employed in [9] , [12] ) and from additional 61 faults after switching from a stalled (faulty) processor to another processor.
Reliability issue
The reliability of the particular device can be calculated by multiplying the estimated nominal SED failure rate which is stated in failure-in-time per megabyte (FIT/Mb) and the number of critical bits. A critical bit is any bit that is important for the functionality of the implemented application. In the critical bit analysis we followed the procedures from Xilinx Critical bit report [10] .
The hardware design of our system was implemented on Virtex 5 xc5vlx50t. According to the Rosetta experiment [13] a Virtex 5 device has a nominal SED failure rate 151 FIT / Mb.
The reliability estimation of our dual processor system is shown in Table 4 . The xc5vlx50t has approximately 11.37 Mb of relevant configuration cells. Therefore this FPGA has a nominal susceptibility of 1717 FIT or a MTBF of approximately 66 years.
The dual processor system occupies 5913 slices which is 82% of the Virtex 5 xc5vlx50t slices. To assess the susceptibility of our system we made an analysis of the critical bits of the design using Xilinx ISE tooL The tool estimated that 16% of the relevant FPGA configuration bits were potentially critical to our design. Hence, the maximum susceptibility to SEU of our design is 275 FIT.
The above susceptibility of our design was a worst case estimation. During fault injection experiment we performed system self-test which indicated that 4.9 % of the 5000 random faults affected the functionality of implemented application. Hence, the critical bit count is smaller and the nominal susceptibility of our system without the error recovery algorithm is around 84 FIT. The system with error recovery algorithm has recovered from 76% of these critical faults. Therefore, our SOPC with error detection has a nominal susceptibility to SEU faults of 20 FIT which corresponds to 5707 years between two failures (MTBF).
The above failure rate estimation was done for atmospheric environment using the data from the Xilinx Rosetta experiment. The SEU failure rates in other environments can be much higher. At places with high elevation above the sea, the SEU rates can be three or four times higher than at the sea-level. In an airplane, the SEU effect can be 100-800 times worse than at the sea-level and in the space environment the rates are even higher.
To increase the reliability and dependability the system has to be carefully designed to prevent faults affecting more than one processor core at a time. The processor cores in the FPGA have to be placed in such a way that they are isolated from each other and the internal signals have to be carefully routed to limit the possibility that an upset would affect more than one processor. The reliability design methodology is described in [4]. 
Conclusions and future work
Highly reliable applications on FPGAs employ SEU mitigation techniques at different system levels. Our approach can be regarded as a low level technique which runs independent of the target application. The salient feature of the proposed approach is low hardware overhead since FPGA configuration memory checking is performed by the same resources as those employed in the target application. Different test scheduling techniques are possible, which provides high flexibility. Performed experimental case study confirms the validity of the proposed approach. Currently, the proposed approach is being applied in the design of a new generation of a non-volatile data storage unit developed for a gaming-system where a very high level of data security and reliability is required. For this purpose, a low area-overhead SEU recovery mechanism based on a finite state machine (FSM) has been developed. In order to assure high reliability TMR structure is employed. Initial fault emulation experiments are showing promising results.
